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POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES

Warren L. Swanson and Roger Eichmeier*
Later Search Without Warrant for Articles
Overlooked During Arrest Held Lawful-A
police officer went to the defendant's home in
order to 'pick up clothing requested by the
defendant's roommate who was being held at
the city jail. Admitted by the landlady, the
officer, while looking for the requested clothing,
came upon a marijuana cigarette and paraphernalia employed in the use of narcotics. Thereafter, the defendant entered the building and,
at the officer's request, invited the latter to
"go ahead and look around." Upon the basis of
evidence discovered in the search, the defendant
was arrested and taken to the police station.
Some hours later, the officer returned to the
residence and retrieved narcotics equipment
which had been left behind at the time of the
arrest. At the trial, the court denied defendant's
motion to exclude the evidence obtained in the
search. On appeal, the admission of the evidence
was affirmed. People v. Stewart, 301 P.2d 301
(Cal. Dist. Ct. of Appeals 1956).
The search of the defendant's premises at the
time of the arrest was made with the defendant's consent, the court said, and was therefore
lawful. Since the narcotics paraphernalia could
have been taken by the police officers at the
time the arrest was made, the court observed,
the officer could lawfully return and retrieve
the article at a later time without first obtaining
a search warrant.
Federal Officerfs Inducement of Defendant
to Commit Crime is Not Entrapment Even
Though Defendant Had Never Before Committed Such Crime-The defendant, a gambler
who had never engaged in the narcotics trade,
was approached by a federal narcotics agent
who represented himself to be a buyer of heroin
in large quantities. In response, the defendant
*Senior Law Students, Northwestern University
School of Law.

stated that, while he was primarily a gambler
and not a narcotics peddler, he knew where
heroin could be obtained. After several unsuccessful attempts by the defendant to obtain
narcotics for the agent, a sale was consummated and, as a result, the defendant was
arrested. At the trial in a federal district court,
the defendant, admitting the sale, pleaded
entrapment. The trial court, denying the
defendant's request for a directed verdict of
acquittal, submitted the question of entrapment to the jury. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, with one member dissenting, affirmed the defendant's conviction. United States v. Masciale, 236 F.2d
601 (2nd Cir. 1956).
The majority acknowledged that the sale of
heroin was induced by the government agent
and that, therefore, the prosecution had the
burden of proving sufficient excuse for the
inducement. Inducing the defendant to commit
a crime is lawful, the court said, if "the accused
was ready and willing to commit the offense
charged whenever the opportunity offered."
The test of entrapment, the court indicated,
is whether the defendant required "persuasion"
to commit the illegal act. The inducement
without the element of persuasion, it was said,
does not constitute entrapment. The defendant's willingness to obtain heroin for the agent,
the majority said, indicates that persuasion
was unnecessary.
The dissent argued that the test of entrapment adopted by the majority contradicts the
rule set out by the United States Supreme
Court in Sorrell v. United States, 287 U. S. 435
(1932) in which it was said that persuading a
person to commit a crime is a valid method of
obtaining evidence of criminal activity "only
if the defendant's past conduct justifies the
belief that, without persuasion by a government officer, the defendant would have com-
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mitted the crime or a similar crime." By this
test, the dissent maintained, the defendant
must have previously committed a substantially similar crime as that induced or the
inducement will constitute entrapment. The
dissent could see no rational basis for the
distinction made by the majority between an
easy and a difficult persuasion. As a practical
matter, it was said, the degree of persuasion
necessary to constitute entrapment will be
impossible to ascertain. "The result will be,"
the dissent observed, "that the federal policeinstead of devoting themselves to the job of
catching criminals-may, when it pleases them,
spend their time and government money turning potential into actual criminals, shoving over
into criminals men who may be hovering on the
brink."
Results of Lie-Detector Test Are Admissible
to Rebut Unfavorable Inferences Raised by
Opponent's Statement that He Had Taken
Test-Upon the destruction of his home by
fire, the plaintiff filed a claim with the defendant
insurance company which had issued a policy
insuring the dwelling against such an occurrence. The claim was rejected by the defendant
on the grounds that the blaze had been deliberately set by or at the instigation of the
plaintiff. Thereupon, the plaintiff submitted to
a lie-detector test which was administered by
an arson investigator for the City of Houston,
Texas. Subsequently, suit was brought by the
plaintiff against the insurance company for the
proceeds of the policy. At the trial, before the
judge and without a jury, in a federal district
court, the plaintiff, testifying in his own behalf,
volunteered the information that he had agreed
to take a lie-detector test. However, the plaintiff did not reveal the results of the test. Thereafter, the defendant offered the testimony of
the investigator who had conducted the liedetector examination. The witness stated that
he had interpreted the results of the test as
indicating that the plaintiff had lied when he
answered "no" to such questions as: "do you
know who set fire to your house?; did you set
fire to your house?; did you ever set fire to a
building?; were you in your house when the fire

started?; did you have someone set fire to your
house?" At the conclusion of the evidence, the
trial judge indicated that he would consider the
testimony of the lie-detector expert only for
purposes of impeaching the credibility of the
plaintiff as a witness; such evidence, the judge
said, would not be admissible for any other
purpose. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of
the trial court for the plaintiff and approved
the introduction of the lie-detector results for
the limited purpose of removing the inferences
raised by the plaintiff's statement that he had
agreed to take such a test. CaliforniaInsurancc
Campany v. Allen, 235 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1956).
The court rejected the defendant's contention that when the plaintiff injected into the
case, in his own behalf, that he had agreed to
take a lie-detector test, the results of the test
became admissible for all purposes. The trial
court, it was said, had wisely exercised its discretion over the admission of evidence by
limiting the use of the test results to "the extent necessary to remove any unfair prejudice
which might otherwise have ensued from the
original evidence." The court did not decide
the question of whether the trial court would
have abused its discretion had it admitted the
test results for their general probative value in
rebuttal of the plaintiff's entire testimony.
However, an examination of decisions from
other jurisdictions, it was said,- revealed -an
almost unanimous rejection of the results of
lie-detector tests as evidence.
Evidence of Defendant's Offer to Take a
Lie-Detector Test Is Inadmissible-The defendant was indicted for murder. At the trial,
the defendant sought to introduce testimony
to the effect that two or three months after his
arrest he had expressed a willingness to submit
to a lie-detector test. Such an offer, the defendant maintained, indicated a "consciousness of
innocence." The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania approved the refusal by the trial judge
to admit evidence of the defendant's offer.
Commanwealth v. Saunders, 125 A.2d 442 (Pa.
1956).
Since the results of a lie-detector test cannot
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be considered as evidence, it was said, the
circumstance of an offer or refusal to undergo
such a test should not be admissible. "Defendant's offer," the court concluded, "was merely
a self-serving act or declaration which obviously
could be made without any possible risk, since,
if the offer were accepted and the test given,
the result, whether favorable or unfavorable
to the accused, could not be given in evidence."
See also, Cananonwealth v. McKinley, 123 A.2d
735 (Pa. 1956).
Judicial Notice Accorded Radar Speedmeter
as a Device for Measuring Automobile SpeedThe defendant was arrested for exceeding the
speed limit on the basis of evidence obtained
through the use of a radar speedmeter. At the
trial in a New York City Magistrate's Court,
the arresting officers, who had received training
in the use of the equipment, testified that the
radar unit used consisted of a transmitterreceiver which sent and received micro waves,
an indicator which registered the rate of speed
of automobiles passing through the beam cast
by the transmitter, and a recording device
which graphically registered the speed indicated. The equipment was installed in a squad
car stationed along the highway being checked.
A thousand feet in front of the radar vehicle
an intercepting car was stationed which, upon
receipt of a description of the violator from the
radar unit, made the arrest. The violator remained in view of the radar car, as well as the
intercepting squad car, until apprehended.
Testimony indicated that the radar device was
tested at the beginning and end of the day by
driving a motorcycle with a calibrated speedometer through the radar beam and comparing
the speed arrived at by the radar with that
indicated on the motorcycle speedometer.
Expert testimony was offered as to the nature
and function of the device. It was stated by the
expert that radar is an accurate method of
speedchecking, "but subject to an engineering
tolerance of two miles per hour, plus or minus."
The defendant argued that, because of this
variation, radar is not reliable evidence that an
offender drove at a certain rate of speed in
excess of the speed limit.
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Proof of a lesser prohibited rate of speed,
the defendant said, would be proof of an offense
other than that charged. The court rejected
this notion, holding that proof of any speed in
excess of the legal limit is sufficient to establish
a conviction and is included within a charge of
driving at a specific excessive rate. The fact
that radar devices have a small inherent degree
of error, the court said, will not prevent their
use as evidence. In addition, the court concluded that such devices are of sufficient scientific worth to be introduced in the evidence, in
future proceedings, without preliminary expert
testimony as to their nature and function. The
appellate courts of New York, it was said, have
not as yet considered this question; however,
other jurisdictions in increasing numbers have
accorded judicial notice to the accuracy of
reasonably tested radar devices. Noting the
judicial acceptance accorded to other scientific
law enforcing aids, the court said that "to deny
such recognition to an adequately tested radar
speedmeter unless expert testimony is first
given as to its nature and function is to make
a fetish of expert testimony." However, it was
said, such judicial notice will not establish
radar results as conclusive evidence of guilt.
The degree of error inherent in the function of
the device, the court indicated, will provide a
substantial question as to the weight to be
accorded the evidence. People v. Nasella, 155
N.Y.S.2d 463 (N. Y. City Magistrate's Ct.-.
1956).
Free Replay Feature Makes Pinball Machine
a Gambling Device-Plaintiff, a pinball machine operator, sought a declaratory judgment
that a "Skill Pool" type of machine does not
violate an Ohio statute which prohibits the
keeping of a "gambling device for gain."
Plaintiff's coin-operated machines offered a
free replay to players who attained a certain
score. Such a prize, it was contended, is not
sufficient to constitute gambling. In addition,
plaintiff claimed, the attainment of a score
necessary to obtain a free replay is predominantly dependent upon skill rather than chance.
The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the
machine constituted a gambling device. Wester-
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haus v. City of Ciixinnati, 135 N.E.2d 318
(Ohio 1956).
"The elements of gambling," the court said,
"are payment of a price for a chance to gain a
prize." The player, it was said, pays a price to
operate the machine. As for the element of
chance, the court observed that, "although it
would be inaccurate to say that there can be a
gamble upon something certain, there can be a
gamble on the happening of an event, the
happening of which may be largely dependent
upon skill, even the skill of a participant." The
element of a prize, it was said, may be found in
the avoidance of paymentfor something of value.
Amusement obtained through the operation of
a pinball machine is a thing of value. Therefore,
the court concluded, a free replay is a sufficient
prize to qualify, when the other elements are
present, a pinball machine as a gambling device.
Listening in on Extension Telephone Does
Not Violate Wire Tap Act-The defendant was
indicted on the charge of transmitting threats
over an interstate telephone connection for
purposes of extortion. At the trial in a federal
district court the prosecution sought to introduce testimony of state police officers who, at
the invitation of the complainant, had listened
in on an extension phone to a call made to the
complainant by the defendant. The defendant
contended that the officers' testimony would
violate the "Wire Tapping Statute," 47
U.S.C.A. §605 which provides in part that "no
person not being authorized by the sender
shall intercept any communication and divulge
or publish the existence, contents, substance,
purport, effect or meaning of such intercepted
communication to any person." The United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
approved admission of the testimony. Rathbun
v. United States, 236 F.2d 514 (10th Cir. 1956).
It is well settled, the court said, that an
unauthorized interception may not be revealed
without the consent of the sender. However,
only the sender may invoke the protection of
the statute and, in addition, the communication
is protected only if intercepted prior to its
receipt by the other party to the conversation.

Therefore, the questions to be decided, it was
said, are the identity of the sender and what
constitutes interception. The court held that
while both parties are alternately senders and
receivers during a phone conversation, the
party who initiates the call is the sender under
the statute. What constitutes an interception,
the court indicated, is a question of mechanics
and depends upon whether the extension is so
attached to the telephone line as to allow the
message to reach the party listening in before
reaching the intended receiver. Accepting the
determination of the trial court that the receiver and the listener heard the conversation
simultaneously, the court concluded that no
interception had taken place.
Eighteen-Hour Delay in Arraignment Precludes Use of Confession in Federal Court-At
7:00 p.m. the defendant was arrested and
taken to the police station. A 45-minute interrogation began at 8:00 p.m. The questioning
was resumed at 11:00 p.m. and continued until
midnight when the defendant was produced at
a police line-up. Intermittent questioning took
place between 12:30 a.m. and 3:00 a.m. during
which time a lie-detector test was administered
to the defendant. Between 3:00 a.m. and 4:00
a.m. the defendant retracted his former denials
of guilt and made a full oral confession. Then
defendant slept until 7:30 a.m. at which time,
upon awakening, he repeated his oral confession. At 9:30 a.m. the defendant was taken to
the scene of the crime to re-enact the occurrence. Upon his return to police headquarters,
a written confession was prepared which the
defendant signed at 2:00 p.m. Thereafter the
defendant was arraigned before a United
States Commissioner. At the trial, the court
admitted both the oral and written confession
over the defendant's objection that they were
obtained in violation of rules 5(a) and (b) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which
require that an accused be taken before the
nearest available magistrate without unnecessary delay, and that, once arraigned, the
defendant be advised of his right to counsel
and that any statements made by him might
be used against him. The prosecutor, in his
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argument to the jury, stated that the questioning took place intermittently during the entire
night because, by the next morning, "we would
find the place crawling with attorneys telling
him, 'you don't have to talk to the police.' "
The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit reversed defendant's conviction, holding that, while the oral
confessions were properly admitted, the
written confession should have been excluded.
lVatson v. United States, 234 F.2d 42 (D.C.
Cir. 1956).
The court had little difficulty in concluding
that no unnecessary delay was involved in
securing the oral confessions which were made
at 3:30 a.m. and repeated at 8:00 a.m. The
police, it was said, are entitled to a reasonable
period following the arrest in which to question
the defendant and make inquiry to determine
whether a complaint is warranted. However,
the court said, by 9:00 a.m. the police possessed
sufficient facts to justify filing a complaint. In
addition, at that time, judges and commissioners were available before whom arraignment could be had. The subseqdient delay, the
court said, was clearly unnecessary. However,
it was said, mere delay in arraignment will not
invalidate a confession obtained during its
continuance. The delay must be "for the very
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purpose of securing these challenged confessions" and in addition, the detention must have
"produced the disclosure." The arguments of
the prosecutor during the case, the court
stated, indicated that the purpose of the delay
was to avoid the effects of rule 5(b); once advised of his right to counsel, interrogation of
defendant would be difficult. Therefore the
delay was for the purpose of securing the
written confession. In addition, the court
thought it clear that the cumulative effect of
the detention produced the written confession.
Reckless Driving through Several Counties
Is Only One Offense-Defendant was pursued
through two counties at ninety miles per hour
and, upon his apprehension, was tried and
convicted in both counties for violating a state
statute prohibiting reckless driving. On appeal
it was held that the conviction in the first
county constituted res judicata as to the charge
in the second county and that a second prosecution would place the defendant in double
jeopardy. Where a violation of a state statute
is charged, the court indicated, the crossing of
county lines does not create a new offense.
State v. Willhite, 123 A.2d 237 (N. J. 1956).
(For other recent case abstracts, see pages
574-579)

